CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010
B. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
- 90. Based on reports from lower-ranking officials to their superiors, directives from superiors to subordinates, and requests for assistance of information that were discovered, among other evidence,254 it appears that the main inter-personal or inter-office communication was by letter, telegram and messenger. Official communication also took place in meetings and at gatherings at each administrative level as well as at larger rallies in Phnom Penh.255 Invitations to such official meetings were generally distributed by messenger or telegram. Furthermore, the CPK disseminated a number of directives and political education material throughout the country. Such material was sent from the centre to lower administrative ranks.
Lower ranks would, in turn, disseminate the material among the population in the zones and sectors.256
Letters
- 91. Letters were sent from senior CPK leaders such as POL Pot, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary.257 Letters were reportedly delivered through messengers to zone and sector secretaries.258 One of the telegrams sent from the Central Zone (fomer North Zone) indicates that letters were sometimes carried in person by higher officials such as Zone Secretary Ke Pork himself.259
Messengers
- 92. Messengers were primarily used to deliver reports and telegrams from the radio telegraphic unit to ministries260 or for communicating information about arrests.261 Within the different zones, “Messengers carried correspondence by hand on bicycles and motorcycles. Messengers were very busy and spent only a short time in each location before returning to their home base. Messengers were not tied to one single link but worked all the different links serviced by their station”.262 One witness states that messengers from the Centre would use a speed boat to get to Kratie in Autonomous Sector 505.263
Telegram Communication
- 93. After the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975, the central telegram unit that had operated in the “liberated areas” was moved to Phnom Penh.264 About 40 children were recruited from the provinces and were taught the basic working techniques of telegram communication (coding, typing, etc.) as well as sometimes French and English.265 On 9 October 1975 the Standing Committee decided on the functioning of the telegram unit.266
- 94. The telegram unit, which was divided into two sections (one responsible for transmitting and receiving the telegram, and the other for the encoding and decoding)267 was code named K-18 and was located in Phnom Penh at the old United States Embassy (now the Fishery Administration).268 Office K-18 was composed of an internal communications section with Oeun in charge and an external communications section with Rim in charge.269. Approximately 20 to 30 persons worked in each of the two sections. 270 Subsequent chairmen of the telegram unit were Yos271 (also mentioned as deputy chief2‘2) and ,3
- 95. Within the zones, a telegram unit consisted of a telegram coder, a transmitter or operator and a typist or secretary.
- 96. Outgoing messages from the Centre were first sent to the telegram coding unit which was located at the Party Centre office K-1 to be encoded into number codes.275 The encoded message was then forwarded to the operation group at K-18 that transmitted the messages to the recipients in coded form, where they decoded it into plain text.276 Incoming telegrams from the zones arrived at K-18 and were written down by the typist group. The encoded message was then sent to K-1 for decoding and transmitted to the receiving Party cadre.277 Incoming telegrams were forwarded to other cadre upon the decision of Pol Pot and his staff, who received copies of all messages.278 Where the word “document” was attributed to a message, this implied that it was to be kept in the archive of the respective telegram translator.279 Copies of the coded and the text versions of the telegram had to be kept for six months before they were burnt.280
- 97. The following recipient code names were frequently used in telegrams: “Grand Uncle” for Pol Pot;281 “Grand Uncle Nuon” for;282 “Grand Uncle Vann” for Ieng Sary;283 “Grand Uncle Vorn” for Vorn Vet;284 “Uncle Hem” for Khieu Samphan;285 “Respected Brother” for Pol Pot;286 “K-3” for Office of Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea;287 and “K-1” for Office of Pol Pot.288
- 98. The number “870” was identified by several witnesses as the code number of the Centre.289 Charged person Khieu Samphan states in this regard: “Pol Pot signed documents by writing 870”.290 The word “M-870” was identified by witnesses as the code number for the Central Committee Office or for Nuon Chea and Pol Pot interchangeably. The word Committee 870 referred to the Central Committee.293 According to Charged person Duch: “Any fax or letter with the name “Pol” “870” or “Office 870” referred to Pol Pot“.294
Political and Education Material
Print Media
- 99. The Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth magazines were the most important CPK propaganda magazines and reflected the views of the senior Party leaders, in particular the views of the Standing committee, although there were also other magazines produced during the regime. They were produced in office K-25 295 by the Ministry of Propaganda.296 From April 1975 until his arrest in 1977, Hou Nim was the Minister of Propaganda.297 Following his arrest Yun Yat took control of the Ministry of Propaganda.298
- 100. Revolutionary Flag had existed as an underground “secret magazine” during the struggle prior to 1975,299 and remained the official Party publication during the CPK era.300
- 101. The Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth Magazines were a propaganda tool used to reflect the Party policy on a monthly basis.301 Only Party members had access to the magazines themselves and they were used to educate political and military cadres. They had to study the magazine, disseminate its policies to those under their charge and then implement them.304 They also had to attend study sessions on them. Revolutionary Youth was distributed among the members of the Youth League.305
- 102. The magazines influenced all channels of government public communication. The contents of radio broadcasts, for example, were drawn from articles.306 Copies of Revolutionary Flag were found in S-21 and at surrounding houses.307 Duch himself stated that he used Revolutionary Flag for information on the “general policy line of the Party “.308 Evidence also suggests that the magazines were received by 870 offices309 as well as being disseminated abroad to the Cambodian embassy in China.310
- 103. The magazines were also used for teaching purposes, in particular, by Nuon Chea311 and Ieng Sary.312 More general study sessions were held to rally the people and called for “young men and women to join the revolution”.313 According to some witnesses, “the guidelines in the magazines were illustrated in a very sharp way and if a person would not adapt himself or herself to that, then this person automatically would be considered as an enemy”314 and a core message was that opponents to the Party would be considered as enemies.315
- 104. A witness states that in one incident, leaflets that were published at K-25 were dropped from planes in the East Zone and contained allegations against Sao Phim and appealed to the people to stay calm.316
Film and Photography
- 105. The CPK had a stringent policy on filming. The aim of the film was to present the success of the agricultural community. With this aim, film crews were established and clear directions were given: “What we should shoot? (We) must capture the movement of building up the country, country defense, especially building up of country’s rural areas. We shoot (films) of their activities from start to finish”.317
- 106. Filming was seen as an important way to involve the public in the policies of the Party as explained at a working meeting on 1 June 1976: “Generally speaking, filming is an important matter. The public really demand it. If they see the updated situation, they are happy because they show their masterpiece and they represent their own story “.318
- 107. Photography was seen as second to filming and the only guidance given was to take pictures of ceremonies, or foreign guests for documentary purpose.319 There was a photography and cinematography section at the Soviet Technological School under the Ministry of Propaganda.320
Public Radio
- 108. Radio was seen as the principal method to disseminate the revolutionary idea among the people by the leadership.321 In this regard, guidelines were given on interviewing people in the zones, on how news would be announced, and on what other programs would be aired.322 Chinese experts were consulted for the technical establishment of radio broadcasting.323
- 109. Prior to 1975, the CPK possessed a mobile broadcast radio in Steung Trang District.324 Songs were taped in Steung Trang and then sent to the main radio station of FUNK in Hanoi,325 which was headed by Ieng Thirith in 1973,326 while the technical work was provided by the Vietnamese.327 The mobile radio unit, which was in place and broadcasting during the evacuation of Phnom Penh was transferred to the capital and became the only broadcast unit in the country.328
- 110. The Ministry of Propaganda there was a group of writers, the interview section, the writing section and the editing section.329 Radio broadcasts featured international news extracted from the international radio and domestic news published by the Ministry which circulated mainly around the praise of rural cooperatives and the achievements of the regime the Party line, the leadership of the Party and speeches, the defence of the country and followed an educational purpose.
- 111. News was also extracted from radio channels from Vietnam, China, Laos and Thailand. No news criticizing Democratic Kampuchea was broadcasted.331 Broadcasts also featured English and Vietnamese speaking programs and there were preparations to broadcast in Thai. Special programming intended for Khmer in Vietnam – what the CPK called Kampuchea Krom – was broadcast about the Khmer-Vietnamese border conflict, the relocation of Khmer Krom to Phnom Den in Cambodia and the alleged persecution of Khmer Krom by Vietnam.333
- 112. Confessions of Vietnamese prisoners of war, who had been interrogated at S-21, were broadcasted over the radio,334 in an attempt to show that the Vietnamese had entered Cambodian territory.335 One witness states that Vietnamese prisoners of war were interrogated in the battlefield and the taped interviews were sent to the radio for broadcast.336